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Comments
SPEAK YOUR MIND AND RIDE THE PINE: EXAMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNIVERSITY-IMPOSED SOCIAL
MEDIA BANS ON STUDENT-ATHLETES
“Student athletes nationwide are facing discipline for speaking their
minds.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2016, Louisiana-Lafayette (“ULL”) football
coach, Mark Hudspeth, suspended a handful of players for their
role in a video in which the players can be seen singing along to the
lyrics from a song entitled “FDT,” an acronym for “Fuck Donald
Trump.”2 The video, which was shared on social media two days
after Donald Trump won the U.S. presidential election, depicted
several Ragin’ Cajun players making lewd gestures and singing controversial lyrics from the song by rappers, YG and Nipsey Hussle.3
In a statement to the press, university Athletic Director, Scott
Farmer, disparaged the players’ actions and supported the suspensions, adding that “[t]his video in no way represents the views and
values of the Ragin’ Cajuns Football program, the Athletics Department or the University of Louisiana at Lafayette.”4 In his comments
to the media regarding the incident, Hudspeth further added to
the controversy, commenting that the lewd comments in the video
1. Samantha Harris, Do Student Athletes Have Any Free-Speech Rights? Discipline of
Columbia Wrestlers Raises the Question, NY DAILY NEWS (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:09 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/student-athletes-free-speech-rights-article1.2882588.
2. See SI Wire, Louisiana-Lafayette Suspends Four Players for ‘F*** Donald Trump’
Video, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.si.com/college-football/
2016/11/11/louisiana-lafayette-football-players-donald-trump-song-suspended
[https://perma.cc/8TT3-YCH8] (detailing incident at University of Louisiana at
Lafayette).
3. See Christopher Weingarten, YG Talks Summer Protest Anthem ‘FDT (F—k Donald Trump)’, ROLLINGSTONE (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/
features/yg-talks-summer-protest-anthem-fdt-f—k-donald-trump-w437360 [https:/
/perma.cc/DB5H-CVSG] (detailing artist YG’s inspiration behind controversial
lyrics).
4. Alec Nathan, University of Louisiana at Lafayette Disciplines Players After AntiTrump Video, BLEACHERREPORT (Nov. 12, 2016), http://bleacherreport.com/arti
cles/2675615-university-of-louisiana-at-lafayette-disciplines-players-after-anti-trumpvideo [https://perma.cc/UVU2-W4XC] (quoting ULL athletic director, Scott
Farmer).
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were “very disappointing, especially towards one of the candidates”
and that “[t]he few men involved did not even vote in the presidential election. So, they did not have a dog in the hunt.”5
The situation at Louisiana-Lafayette is not an isolated incident
as, throughout college athletics, student-athletes are forced to
choose between exercising their constitutional right to free speech
and riding the pine.6 This article will attempt to elucidate arguments both in favor of and against student-athlete speech censorship.7 Section I of this piece detailed the complicated situation at
the University of Louisiana-Lafayette.8 Section II of this piece will
discuss the legal and historical background of the First Amendment, focus on the speech rights of ordinary students, specifically
detailing the substantive rights of student-athletes, and paint the
current landscape of student-athlete speech rights.9 Section III will
present arguments for and against student-athlete social media
bans.10 Finally, Section IV will recommend that universities implement narrowly-tailored social media bans that respect the rights of
student-athletes and protect university interests.11
II. BACKGROUND
The First Amendment reflects “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”12 During and after the United
States Constitution’s ratification process, many state representatives
5. Richard Johnson, ULL Suspends 4 Players for Locker Room Video Involving ‘F***
Donald Trump’ Song, SBNATION (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.sbnation.com/college
-football/2016/11/11/13581166/mark-hudspeth-suspends-players-donald-trump
[https://perma.cc/RS22-WJRH] (quoting ULL head football coach, Mark
Hudspeth).
6. See, e.g., J. Wes Gay, Hands off Twitter: Are NCAA Student-Athlete Social Media
Bans Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 781 (2012).
Some National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) student-athletes
of various sports and institutions have recently been instructed that they
are not permitted to use certain social media platforms. The purported
reasons causing universities to implement these bans range from interests
in image control to pressure from the NCAA to monitor and report potential NCAA infractions. However, these bans are likely
unconstitutional.
Id.
7. See infra notes 160–201 and accompanying text.
8. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 12–159 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 160–201 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 202–207 and accompanying text.
12. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (“Thus we consider
this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and
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expressed concern that the new Constitution did not adequately
protect the rights of the individual citizen; the drafting and eventual adoption of the Bill of Rights was in large part a result of these
concerns.13 The First Amendment proclaims, “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the government for a redress or grievance.”14 While the
amendment was originally aimed toward the federal government,
with the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the amendment’s
coverage was extended to states.15
A. Theories of Free Speech
In the 226 years since the First Amendment’s ratification, commentators have offered a multitude of rationales for granting special protections to speech; three particular rationales have generally
dominated debates regarding First Amendment theory.16 The first
is the idea that free speech is valuable as a means of pursuing truth,
for “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market.”17 The second rationale is that free speech is necessary for citizens in a democracy to
have the freedom to propose and debate public issues in order to
govern themselves effectively.18 In other words, “the principle of
the freedom of speech . . . is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal sufthat it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”).
13. See, e.g., David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L.
REV. 429, 456 (1983) (“Despite an early perception that a delineation of the rights
of the people was unnecessary, Congress eventually decided that freedom of
speech needed explicit protection against infringement by the federal
government.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“It
has long been established that these First Amendment freedoms are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.”).
16. For further discussion about rationales for granting special protections to
speech, see infra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
17. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
18. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 26–27 (1948) (discussing theories of free speech).
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frage.”19 The third rationale is built on the idea that “[o]ur ability
to deliberate, to reach conclusions about our good, and to act on
those conclusions is the foundation of our status as free and rational persons.”20 All of these theories center on the idea that the
First Amendment was established to “remove governmental restraints” from the field of public discourse.21 As a general matter,
“[a]bove all else, the First Amendment means that the government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, ideas,
subject matter, or content.”22 Any statute, regulation, or official act
that needlessly encroaches on the exercise of First Amendment
rights is unconstitutional; however, there are well-established restrictions on free speech.23 For example, the Supreme Court has
instructed that “[n]ot all speech is of equal First Amendment importance and where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”24
B. Government Restrictions on Speech
Generally, the Supreme Court has taken a categorical approach to government restrictions on speech.25 The first category
encompasses content-based restrictions which are considered particularly suspect and are unconstitutional unless necessary to
achieve a compelling governmental interest.26 Content-based restrictions receive the highest level of judicial scrutiny.27 The second
19. Id. at 27.
20. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 233 (1992).
21. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“[The First Amendment] is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena
of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely
into the hands of each of us.”).
22. Police Dep’t of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding
Chicago city ordinance unconstitutional because it made distinction between
peaceful and non-peaceful picketing based on subject matter).
23. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (listing
low-value speech exceptions).
24. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011).
25. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (“There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.”).
26. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983) (“The burden on government to demonstrate the
substantiality of its interests and the absence of less restrictive alternatives varies
from case to case, depending upon the extent to which the restriction actually
interferes with the opportunities for effective communication.”).
27. See, e.g., id. at 209 (“[L]aws that are content-based on their face require
strict scrutiny whether they turn on communicative impact and thus employs the
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category, content-neutral restrictions, are unconstitutional unless
the restriction is closely related to accomplishing an important governmental interest.28 The Supreme Court has explained that the
determining factor in distinguishing between content-based and
content-neutral speech restrictions is “whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys.”29 A third type of restriction on speech is prior
restraint.30 Prior restraints are government actions that prohibit
speech or other expression before speech takes place.31 The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]ny system of prior restraints comes
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.”32
C. Speech Receiving Minimal Protections
Some types of speech receive minimal constitutional protection.33 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire introduced low-value speech exceptions to First Amendment jurisprudence.34 In Chaplinsky, the
Court explained that “there are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”35
This type of speech can be regulated because it neither impedes the
debate of public issues nor risks censorship on matters of public
significance.36 Low-value speech receives the least amount of First
Amendment protection; some of these unprotected categories include incitement to “imminent lawless action,” “fighting words,”
communicative impact concept to expand the class of content-based
restrictions.”).
28. See generally id. at 190–93 (discussing content-neutral restrictions).
29. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (citing Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984)).
30. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409
(1983) (discussing the history of prior restraint in the United States).
31. See 2 Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 15:1(“The phrase ‘prior
restraint’ is a term of art referring to judicial orders or administrative rules that
operate to forbid expression before it takes place.”).
32. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (refusing to
permit injunctions against New York Times and Washington Post that would prevent publication of classified government documents recounting history of Vietnam War).
33. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942) (listing types of speech least-protected by First Amendment).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 571–72.
36. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
760 (1985) (plurality opinion) (holding that false statements in credit report did
not involve matters of public concern to implicate First Amendment claim).
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“true threats,” obscenity, child pornography, defamation and
“speech integral to criminal conduct.”37 The Supreme Court has
refused to create new categories of low-value speech.38 The Court
has also permitted the government to regulate certain categories of
speech in order to control the “secondary effects” of that speech.39
D. Public Forum Doctrine
Where speech takes place can also determine the outcome of a
free-speech dispute.40 The public has greater liberty to exercise its
free-speech rights in so-called “traditional public forums,” such as
city streets, than it does in nonpublic forums, such as a publicschool classroom.41 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,42 Justice Owen Roberts outlined the origins of the public forum doctrine:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and
37. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (citing Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1942)) (“speech integral to criminal
conduct”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“true threats”); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (“imminent
lawless action”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 573 (“fighting words”); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 603 (1986) (“Speech that concerns governmental
processes is entitled to the highest level of protection; speech that has little or
nothing to do with public affairs may be accorded less protection.”).
38. See, e.g., Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472 (“Our decisions in Ferber and other cases
cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories
of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”).
39. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 51 (1986) (holding that zoning ordinance which prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, single, or multiple-family dwelling, church, park,
or school was constitutional).
40. See generally David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L.
REV. 143, 145 (1992) (discussing evolution of public forum doctrine from device
that protected speech to device that restricted speech).
41. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“Our
cases make clear, however, that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech,
provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication
of the information.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
42. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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public places has from ancient times been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.43
In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association,44 the Supreme Court created three categories of public forums: traditional public forums, limited public forums, and
nonpublic forums.45 In a traditional public forum, the government
may not restrict speech based on content unless the “[r]egulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”46 Traditional public forums include
streets, sidewalks, and parks.47 The second category, known as limited or designated public forums, is “public property which the
state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”48 While the limited forum is open, the same restrictions governing traditional public forums apply.49 Examples of limited
public forums include universities, municipal theaters, and school
board meeting rooms.50 The third category is the nonpublic forum; or “public property which is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication.”51 Governmental entities have
expanded latitude in regulating nonpublic forums, as “[t]he state
may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not
an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”52 Even in nonpublic forums, restrictions
on speech must be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral.53
43. Id. at 515.
44. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
45. Id. at 45 (defining different types of forums and each forum’s allowable
restrictions on speech).
46. See, e.g., id. at 45.
47. See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 650 (2010) (“Later cases describe locations like the city park in
Davis or the city sidewalks in Hague as ‘traditional public forums.’”).
48. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
49. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain
the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same
standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”).
50. See, e.g., Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33
NOVA L. REV. 299, 301 (2009) (“[C]ase law reflects that they have done so with
regard to a wide variety of such ‘non-traditional fora’—ranging from government
office waiting rooms, to college campus lawns, to national cemeteries.”).
51. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (stating examples of limited public forums include university meeting facilities, municipal theaters, and school
board meeting rooms).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., James F. Shekleton, The Campus as Agora: The Constitution, Commerce, Gadfly Stonecutters, and Irreverent Youth, 31 J.C. & U.L. 513, 595–96 (2005)
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To enforce a content-based exclusion in a public forum the
government must show that “[i]ts regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.”54 To enforce content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions, the state must narrowly tailor the constraint “to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication.”55 Content-neutral justifications for
regulating speech are, however, still subject to overbreadth challenges, as demonstrated by Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement,56 a case that concerned the state’s interest in preventing
disturbances of the public peace that may be caused by controversial speech. 57 In Forsyth, the Court struck down an ordinance that
allowed county officials to set permit fees for rallies and parades
based on how much police protection was estimated to be required.58 The Forsyth Court noted that such a permit system disproportionately burdens unpopular speech, allowing a “heckler’s
veto.”59
E. Speech Rights of Students in Public Schools
As the adage goes, student-athletes are “students first and athletes second,” so for the purposes of this piece, an overview of the
speech rights of ordinary students may be helpful.60 In the past,
the Supreme Court has espoused the need for “vigilant protection
(“Irrespective of the nature of the forum, government actions to exclude speakers
based upon the content of their speech are subject to strict scrutiny, and government actions to exclude speakers based upon the viewpoint that they express are
invalid per se.”).
54. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
55. Id.
56. 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
57. See id. at 131.
58. See id. at 134 (“The fee assessed will depend on the administrator’s measure of the amount of hostility likely to be created by the speech based on its
content. Those wishing to express views unpopular with bottle throwers, for example, may have to pay more for their permit.”).
59. Id. at 142 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“Assuming 100 people march in a
parade and 10,000 line the route in protest, for example, the Court worries that,
under this ordinance, the county will charge a premium to control the hostile
crowd of 10,000, resulting in the kind of ‘heckler’s veto’ we have previously
condemned.”).
60. Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism [https://perma.
cc/RH85-UG8B] (last visited Aug. 13, 2017) (“Amateur competition is a bedrock
principle of college athletics and the NCAA. Maintaining amateurism is crucial to
preserving an academic environment in which acquiring a quality education is the
first priority. In the collegiate model of sports, the young men and women competing on the field or court are students first, athletes second.”).
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of constitutional freedoms” in public school environments in order
to encourage an atmosphere of learning and the sharing of ideas.61
However, the Court has also “repeatedly emphasized the need for
affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school
officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to
prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”62 The Supreme
Court has held that the state does not have a monopoly on a public
school’s teaching of values or beliefs.63 However, the Court has also
acknowledged that schools have certain obligations that make the
educational setting a special environment for purposes of First
Amendment jurisprudence.64 Over the past fifty years, the Supreme Court has attempted to outline the general parameters
of constitutionally protected student expression within public
schools.65
1. Establishment of Student Speech Rights
In 1943, the Court ruled 6-3, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,66 that school officials who compelled school children to salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance
violated the First Amendment.67 The Court reasoned that there
was an individual “sphere of intellect and spirit” and that the state
could not compel students to engage in actions that would compro-

61. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.”).
62. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969)
(citations omitted).
63. See generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(holding compulsory flag salute law unconstitutional).
64. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655–66 (1995)) (“[W]hile children assuredly do not
shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate, . . . the nature of those
rights is what is appropriate for children in school.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
65. See generally Morse, 551 U.S. 393; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker,
393 U.S. 503; Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
66. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
67. See generally id. (holding compulsory flag salute law unconstitutional).
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mise their core religious beliefs.68 The Court’s ruling in Barnette
laid the foundation for future student-speech cases.69
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,70 the Court addressed the
question of student symbolic speech.71 In Tinker, students wore
black armbands to school to express their opposition to the Vietnam War.72 In response to the students’ plan to wear the armbands, school administrators “adopted a policy that any student
wearing an armband . . . would be asked to remove it, and if he
refused he would be suspended until he returned without the armband.”73 The student protestors filed a complaint in federal court,
seeking both an injunction to prevent the school authorities from
disciplining the students, as well as nominal damages.74 In an opinion by Justice Abe Fortas, the Court concluded that the policy violated the students’ First Amendment right and that the wearing of
the armbands was “closely akin to ‘pure speech,’” holding that
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students.”75 The Tinker Court also stated that behavior, which
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others,” is not constitutionally protected.76

68. See id. at 642 (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.”).
69. For further discussion about the Supreme Court’s ruling in Barnette, see
supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Does the First Amendment Apply to
Public Schools?, NEWSEUM INST., http://www.newseuminstitute.org/about/faq/
does-the-first-amendment-apply-to-public-schools/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2017).
70. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
71. See generally id. (holding that student speech that would obstruct educational process may be regulated).
72. See id. at 505–06 (“As we shall discuss, the wearing of armbands in the
circumstances of this case was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it. It was closely akin to ‘pure speech’ which,
we have repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment.”).
73. Id. at 504.
74. See id. (noting suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).
75. Id. at 506.
76. Id. at 513 (“But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others
is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.”).
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2. Narrowing Rights Established by Tinker
Despite a robust defense of student free speech in Tinker, the
Court subsequently limited these rights by acknowledging the
state’s substantial interest in teaching students socially-appropriate
behavior.77 In Bethel School District Number 403 v. Fraser,78 Chief Justice Warren Burger distinguished a student’s sexually explicit and
offensive speech during a school assembly from Tinker’s non-disruptive, peaceful expression of a political view because the student’s
speech interrupted the work of the school and violated the rights of
other students.79 Whereas the students in Tinker were punished for
a passive manifestation of their viewpoint, the student in Fraser was
punished for using sexually-explicit language that the Court found
inappropriate for a school setting.80 The Fraser decision marked a
change in the Court’s handling of students’ rights as the decision
granted significant deference to school officials concerning appropriate behavior in the public school environment.81
In 1988, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,82 the High
Court adopted an even more deferential standard that has continued to govern regulation of student speech.83 In Hazelwood, former
staff members of a school newspaper filed suit claiming that their
First Amendment rights had been violated when school officials
prevented articles describing students’ experiences with pregnancy
and divorce from being published.84 In Hazelwood, Justice White
authored a majority opinion that held that a student-published pa77. See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that schools may sanction students’ lewd or inappropriate speech).
78. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
79. See id. at 681 (“The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s
countervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior.”).
80. See id. at 675 (“During the entire speech, respondent referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Some of the
students at the assembly hooted and yelled during the speech, some mimicked the
sexual activities alluded to in the speech, and others appeared to be bewildered
and embarrassed.”).
81. See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect
Free Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons from the “College Hazelwood” Case, 68 TENN.
L. REV. 481, 491 (2001) (discussing restriction of student speech from Tinker to
Fraser).
82. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
83. See generally id. (ruling on claim that First Amendment rights were violated
by school’s censorship of certain articles in student run newspaper).
84. See id. at 260 (explaining principal censored articles due to sexual content
of pregnancy article and that divorced parents of students did not consent to divorce article).
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per did not qualify as a “public forum” and, therefore, school officials retained the right to impose reasonable restrictions on student
speech in said paper.85 Justice White’s opinion also declared that
the school principal’s removal of two articles from the newspaper
did not violate students’ speech rights, on the grounds that the articles unfairly intruded on the privacy rights of pregnant students.86
Hazelwood established that, in cases of “school-sponsored”
speech, a court must determine whether the forum has been designated as public or reserved by the government as a nonpublic forum.87 The Court determined that school officials had reserved the
student paper as a nonpublic forum for journalism education and
looked to school board policy, which stated that school-sponsored
publications were developed within the adopted curriculum and
regular classroom activities.88 The Hazelwood Court required that a
school’s motivation for censorship be reasonably related to legitimate educational matters, but legal scholars have speculated that
there might not be an actual limit to a school’s ability to censor
speech due to educational concerns.89
Hazelwood’s impact was profound and immediate as, almost
without exception, courts upheld school officials’ decisions to censor many types of student speech.90 The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit relied on Hazelwood to reject Planned Parenthood’s
claim that the denial of its request to advertise in a school district’s
newspapers, yearbooks, and programs for athletic events violated
free speech rights.91 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
noted that “[c]ivility is a legitimate pedagogical concern” and a stu85. See id. at 260–61 (“The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as
a forum for public expression. School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have by policy or by practice opened the facilities
for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the public,
such as student organizations.”).
86. See id. at 261 (holding that principal acted reasonably by requiring the
deletion of pregnancy article, divorce article, and other articles that were to appear
on same pages of newspaper).
87. See id. at 267 (“[P]ublic schools do not possess all of the attributes of
streets, parks, and other traditional public forums.”).
88. See id. at 267–70 (quoting Hazelwood School Board Policy 348.5) (“School
sponsored publications are developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications in regular classroom activities.”).
89. See generally J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era? The Decline
of Student Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 706 (1988) (discussing limitations on student journalism).
90. See generally Martha M. McCarthy, Post-Hazelwood Developments: A Threat to
Free Inquiry in Public Schools, 81 EDUC. L. REP. 685 (1993) (discussing how Hazelwood
altered trajectory of student-speech rights).
91. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 887 F.2d 935 (9th
Cir. 1989) (concerning action brought by family planning group challenging rejec-
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dent could be disqualified from running for Student Council President because their candidacy speech was ill-mannered and vulgar.92
An Arkansas federal district court upheld a school’s rejection of an
individual’s bid for student council when the court concluded that
the school’s actions were not taken to retaliate against the student’s
outspoken viewpoints but to foster the objectives of the Student
Council.93
The final narrowing of Tinker came in Morse v. Frederick.94 In
Morse, the issue before the Court was whether school administrators
violated the free speech rights of a high school student at an offcampus school event by confiscating a banner bearing the phrase
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” and suspending him.95 The Morse Court
held that “a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment,
restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.”96 The Court declined to apply the Tinker standard, noting that neither Hazelwood
nor Fraser did, and concluded that the speech was not protected
due to the “serious and palpable” danger that drug use posed to the
health and safety of students.97
An overview of the relevant case law narrowing Tinker shows
that discourteous or profane student language may be prohibited
under Fraser, administrators may censor school-sponsored speech
due to any genuine educational concern under Hazelwood, and
speech impacting student safety may be restricted or censored
tion of its advertisements for publication in high school newspapers, yearbooks,
and athletic event programs).
92. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1989) (concerning student disqualified as candidate for student council president due to rude language used in
campaign speech).
93. See Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1461
(E.D. Ark.) (1990) (“[T]he policy serves legitimate ends. Members of the student
council developed the criteria based on what characteristics they thought would be
unfitting of a council member. The students were concerned with ensuring that
qualified, responsible students were elected to the student council and they
wanted to avoid popularity contests or making the election a farce.”).
94. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
95. See id. (“At a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, petitioner
Morse, the high school principal, saw students unfurl a banner . . . which she
regarded as promoting illegal drug use. Consistent with established school policy
prohibiting such messages at school events, Morse directed the students to take
down the banner.”).
96. Id. at 403.
97. See id. at 408 (Congress “[h]as provided billions of dollars to support state
and local drug-prevention programs . . . and required that schools receiving federal funds under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994
certify that their drug-prevention programs “convey a clear and consistent message
that . . . the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and harmful”).
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under Morse.98 “Speech falling outside of these categories is subject
to Tinker’s general rule: it may be regulated only if it would substantially disrupt school operations or interfere with the right of
others.”99 After Hazelwood, the determination of how to examine a
student’s free speech claim became tied to the public forum doctrine, for if the expressive activity occurs in a nonpublic forum,
then Hazelwood will apply.100
3. Applying Speech Rights to College Students
With the Sixth Circuit’s 2012 ruling in Ward v. Polite,101 four
federal circuits have openly incorporated Hazelwood as the standard
by which all student speech, even that of college students, is to be
judged.102 Only the First Circuit has specifically rejected Hazelwood
in the post-secondary education setting.103 However, the Supreme
Court has specifically reserved the question of whether the Hazelwood standard applies at the college level.104 In the early 1970s,
prior to Hazelwood, the Supreme Court decided two cases that defined the Court’s role in protecting the First Amendment rights of
college-level students.105 Although these cases acknowledged the
competing interests of college officials and students, the Court
98. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding
school may discipline student for inappropriate speech); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988) (holding school retained right to impose
reasonable restrictions on speech in student newspaper); Morse v. Frederick 551
U.S. 393 (2007) (holding student’s speech was not protected due to “serious and
palpable” danger that drug use posed to health and safety of students).
99. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding school district’s anti-harassment policy to be unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibited more speech than allowable under Tinker).
100. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Because
we find that a forum analysis requires that the yearbook be analyzed as a limited
public forum—rather than a nonpublic forum—we agree with the parties that Hazelwood has little application to this case.”).
101. 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012).
102. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005); Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1284–85 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Alabama Student Party
v. Student Gov’t Ass’n, 867 F.2d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 1989).
103. See Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473,
480 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that state university’s termination of legal services
office did not violate students’ First Amendment rights).
104. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988)
(“We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate
with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”).
105. See generally Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667
(1973); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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equated the speech rights of students to the rights of those outside
of the school setting.106
In Healy v. James,107 students trying to form a “Democratic Society” on a college campus claimed that their First Amendment rights
were violated when school officials refused to officially recognize
the organization.108 The Court drew attention to the countervailing interests in the case as the interest of those in an
“[e]nvironment free from disruptive interference with the educational process” and the “interest in the widest latitude for free expression and debate consonant with the maintenance of order.”109
Citing Tinker, the Court reaffirmed the application of the First
Amendment at the college and university level.110 The Court further explained its application of Tinker, “[w]hile a college has a legitimate interest in preventing disruption on the campus . . . a
‘heavy burden’ rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness of that action.”111 The Court clarified that “[t]he College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech
or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any
group to be abhorrent.”112
In Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri,113 a
graduate student claimed her First Amendment rights were violated
when she was expelled from journalism school after dispensing a
newspaper that included a political cartoon with profanity and a
lewd sexual act involving a policeman, the Statue of Liberty and the
Goddess of Justice.114 The Court relied on Healy for the proposal
that the “mere dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to
good taste—on a state university campus may not be shut off in the
name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’”115 The Court held that,
106. See infra notes 107–117 and accompanying text (discussing holdings of
Papish and Healy).
107. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
108. See id. (“[C]ollege president . . . was not satisfied petitioners’ group was
independent of National SDS, which he concluded has philosophy of disruption
and violence in conflict with college’s declaration of student rights.”).
109. Id. at 171 (discussing interests of administrators and students being at
opposed).
110. See id. at 180 (“At the outset we note that state colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.”).
111. Id. at 184.
112. Id. at 187–88 (holding that school did not meet heavy burden simply
because school officials found views expressed to be abhorrent).
113. 410 U.S. 667 (1973).
114. See id. at 667–68 (“[O]n the front cover the publishers had reproduced a
political cartoon previously printed in another newspaper depicting policemen
raping the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.”).
115. Id. at 670 (citing Healy, 408 U.S. at 180).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

15

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 2

66

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 25: p. 51

constitutionally, the only restrictions the school could impose were
reasonable time, manner, and place restrictions.116 As previously
noted, the Supreme Court reserved the question of whether the
Hazelwood standard applies in the university setting.117 However,
the most recent clue to provide an indication as to what the Court
might decide in the future is a footnote in Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth.118 The footnote, found
in a concurring opinion by Justice Souter, says that “[c]ases dealing
with the right of teaching institutions to limit expressive freedom of
students have been confined to high schools . . . .”119 Although this
footnote is not controlling, it does suggest that the Supreme Court
has delineated a distinction when First Amendment rights are at
stake between the amount of deference given to school officials at
the high school and collegiate levels.120
F. Rights of Student-Athletes
1. Contractual Nature of the Student-Athlete
Before addressing the constitutional rights of student-athletes,
it must be acknowledged that many aspects of the relationship between a college and its athletes are contractual in nature; individuals who receive athletic scholarships sign a Statement of Financial
Assistance in which the individual agrees to attend the school and
participate in athletics in exchange for financial aid.121 NCAA rules
hold that a university may lessen or withdraw a scholarship if the
student-athlete “[v]oluntarily (on his or her own initiative) with116. See id. (“[T]he University’s action here could be viewed as an exercise of
its legitimate authority to enforce reasonable regulations as to the time, place, and
manner of speech and its dissemination.”).
117. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 n.7 (1988)
(“We need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate
with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”). For further discussion about the Court applying Hazelwood to universities,
see supra notes 102–106 and accompanying text.
118. 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (holding that university violated student’s First
Amendment rights of free speech, free association, and free exercise in imposing
student activity fee).
119. Id. at 238 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).
120. See Frank D. LoMonte, “The Key Word Is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship
Crashes the Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 319 (2013) (“Justice
David Souter’s concurrence cited Hazelwood as an instance in which the ability of
institutions to limit student expression has been confined to K-12 schools.”).
121. See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410, 416 (1992) (quoting Zumbrun v. Univ. S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)) (“It is held
generally in the United States that the ‘basic legal relation between a student and a
private university or college is contractual in nature.’”).
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draws from a sport at any time for personal reasons.”122 In Taylor v.
Wake Forest University,123 the court of appeals of North Carolina held
that athletes are contractually obligated to maintain eligibility, physically and scholastically, when they accept a scholarship.124 Since
most athletic scholarships are subject to yearly renewal, student-athletes are “easily expendable should conflict arise.”125 The fluid nature of athletic scholarships presents many athletes with a dilemma:
comply with censorship of their constitutional rights or risk missing
out on a free education.126
Courts have held that there is no constitutional right to participate in athletics and have instead analogized participation in collegiate athletics to more of a contract expectation: “[a] student’s
interest in participating in a single year of interscholastic athletics
amounts to a mere expectation rather than a constitutionally protected claim of entitlement.”127 Courts have used the special status
of athletics to uphold restrictions including a football team’s “nofacial-hair-grooming” policy and a transfer rule.128

122. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, NCAA MANUAL, bylaw 15.3.4.2(d)
(“Aid based in any degree on athletics ability may be reduced or canceled during
the period of the award if the recipient . . . . [v]oluntarily (on his or her own
initiative) withdraws from a sport at any time for personal reasons.”).
123. 191 S.E.2d 379 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972).
124. Id. at 382 (“Gregg Taylor, in consideration of the scholarship award,
agreed to maintain his athletic eligibility and this meant both physically and
scholastically.”).
125. Maxwell Strachan, Why the Mizzou Protests Are a Watershed Moment in Sports
Activism, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/en
try/missouriprotestscoach_us_564244a9e4b0307f2caf3cf2 [https://perma.cc/
57SJ-WCXV]; see also MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 111 (4th ed. 2016) (“Beginning in 2012, the
NCAA authorized universities to award multi-year scholarships of up to five
years.”).
126. See Marcus Hauer, The Constitutionality of Public University Bans of StudentAthlete Speech Through Social Media, 37 VT. L. REV. 413, 426 (2012) (“Should a court
find that the preemptive bans are constitutional, players midway through a college
career may be forced to abandon social media as an outlet for speech. To do
otherwise, they would risk losing their athletic scholarship and perhaps the opportunity to earn a college degree.”).
127. Walsh v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 616 F.2d 152, 159 (5th Cir. 1980)
(denying claim that transfer rule resulted in denial of equal protection).
128. See Humphries v. Lincoln Par. Sch. Bd., 467 So. 2d 870, 872 (La. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that improving academic and athletic performance by football
team’s members were constitutionally permissive objectives of grooming policy);
see also Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Carlberg, 694 N.E.2d 222, 243 (Ind. 1998)
(holding that “prevent[ing] the evils associated with recruiting of high school athletes and transfers motivated by athletics” is constitutionally permissible objective
of transfer rule).
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In Hysaw v. Washburn University of Topeka,129 black football team
members at the University boycotted practice to protest the unequal amount of athletic scholarships they received in comparison to
white players.130 When the athletes refused to apologize for the
boycott, they were dismissed from the team.131 The Hysaw court
found that the players did not have a property interest in the contractual rights to play football for the university, but only had a
property right in the scholarship funds; therefore the university and
its officials were not liable under the civil rights statute.132
One of the most significant cases in the realm of student-athlete rights was the Supreme Court’s decision in Vernonia School District v. Acton.133 In Vernonia, the Court determined that a school
district’s student-athlete warrantless drug-testing policy was constitutional.134 In finding the program valid, the Court identified that
student-athletes willingly subject themselves to a greater amount of
regulation than the normal student by voluntarily electing to participate in athletics: “students who voluntarily participate in school
athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and
privileges, including privacy.”135
2. History of Student-Athlete Rights
The Supreme Court has allowed state actions against studentathletes to stand even when those same actions would be unconstitutional if applied to non-student-athletes.136 Coaches have refused
to recruit tattooed athletes or mandated that athletes with tattoos
129. 690 F. Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987).
130. See id. at 946 (1987) (denying defendants’ motion for summary
judgment).
131. See id. at 943 (“Defendants claim that the reasons plaintiffs were not allowed to return to the team were that they had missed practice and positional
meetings and had failed to show leadership. Plaintiffs claim they were not allowed
to return because they boycotted in protest of the alleged racial mistreatment of
black football players at Washburn.”).
132. See id. at 944 (“The court has determined that the only interests created
by those agreements are interests in receiving scholarship funds. Any other terms
plaintiffs attempt to read into those agreements are, without supporting evidence,
no more than unilateral expectations.”) (internal quotations omitted).
133. 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (holding that suspicion-less drug policy was constitutional under Fourth Amendment).
134. See id. at 657 (“Somewhat like adults who choose to participate in a
‘closely regulated industry,’ students who voluntarily participate in school athletics
have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy.”).
135. Id.
136. See generally id. For further discussion of Vernonia School District v. Acton,
see supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
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keep them covered.137 The Alabama, Florida, and Texas A&M football teams all forbid freshman players from talking to the media.138
Historically, college athlete speech rights have fared little better.139
The First Amendment is often implicated when a student-athlete’s speech is censored.140 In Williams v. Eaton,141 University of
Wyoming football players were dismissed from the team for violating a longstanding team rule that prohibited team members from
engaging in protests.142 The Wyoming players wanted to wear black
armbands in protest of the University’s scheduled home game with
Brigham Young University (“BYU”), a Mormon University, to protest Mormon teachings regarding alleged racial policies.143 The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found for the University,
holding that the dismissal “[p]rotected against invasion of the
rights of others by avoiding a hostile expression to them by some
members of the University team.”144
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also ruled,
in Marcum v. Dahl,145 that it was permissible to dismiss certain members of the women’s basketball team, at the University of
Oklahoma, for making disparaging remarks about the team’s head
137. See ROBERT PALESTINI, A GAME PLAN FOR EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP: LESSONS
10 SUCCESSFUL COACHES IN MOVING THEORY TO PRACTICE 156 (2008) (discussing legendary University of Tennessee women’s basketball coach, Pat Summitt,
and her policy on player tattoos).
138. See Mike Bianchi, Will Muschamp Is Less Accessible to Media Than—Wait for
It—Nick Saban, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 18, 2012, 8:08 PM), http://articles.orlan
dosentinel.com/2012-08-18/sports/os-mike-bianchi-florida-gators-0819-20120818_
1_muschamp-florida-gators-coach-urban-meyer [https://perma.cc/52G3-J3GG]
(criticizing “freshman ban” and noting irony that “these players are old enough to
fight for their country, vote and call audibles in front [of] 100,000 enemy fans . . .
but they’re not mature enough to talk to the media for 10 minutes after the
game?”); Andy Staples, With Heisman Ceremony Looming, Johnny Football Finally
Speaks, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 26, 2012, 6:03 PM), https://www.si.com/moresports/2012/11/26/johnny-football-finally-speaks-verge-heisman [https://
perma.cc/8JF2-CSPH] (indicating that Texas A&M coach allowed exception to his
policy of not allowing freshman to speak to press in hopes of accelerating
Manziel’s Heisman campaign).
139. For further discussion about the history of athlete-speech over the last
forty years, see infra notes 140–147 and accompanying text.
140. See Noel Johnson, Tinker Takes the Field: Do Student Athletes Shed Their Constitutional Rights at the Locker Room Gate?, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 293, 297 (2010)
(discussing constitutional rights of student-athletes at college level).
141. 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972).
142. See id. at 1084 (“Without deciding whether approval of the armband display would have involved state action or a violation of the religion clauses, we are
persuaded that the Trustees’ decision was lawful within the limitations of the
Tinker case itself.”).
143. See id. at 1081.
144. Id. at 1084.
145. 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981).
FROM
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coach to the press.146 The Marcum court concluded that “[t]he
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were not violated by the defendants’ refusal to renew the plaintiffs’ athletic scholarships” because
the “[c]ontroversy resulted in disharmony among the players
and disrupted the effective administration of the basketball
program.”147
3. Modern Landscape of Student-Athlete Speech Rights
Public universities such as Boise State University, University of
Iowa, and University of Kansas have all instituted social media bans
for football players.148 In 2011, University of South Carolina head
football coach, Steve Spurrier, banned his players from using Twitter.149 When asked by reporters why he had banned his players
from using the social media site, Spurrier said, “[w]ell, we have
some dumb, immature players that put crap on their Twitter, and
we don’t need that. So, the best thing to do is just ban it.”150 In
2011, Florida State coach, Jimbo Fisher, temporarily banned Twitter for his team after a loss because he was unhappy in how they
responded to negative tweets.151 In 2012, Fisher reinstituted the
ban when one of his players used Twitter to complain about being
pulled over by the police and various members of the team tweeted
about a range of topics from killing cops to disparaging child support payments.152
146. See id. 733 (stating players alleged that school’s non-renewal of scholarships implicated freedom of speech and due process violations).
147. Id. at 734–35.
148. See Gay, supra note 6, at 796 (“A larger number of public schools have
banned college football players from using social media. Their teams are as follows: the University of South Carolina Gamecocks, the Boise State University Broncos, the University of Iowa Hawkeyes, and the University of Kansas Jayhawks.”).
149. See David Cloninger, Spurrier Bans Team from Twitter, GAMECOCKCENTRAL . COM (Aug. 4, 2011), http://southcarolina.rivals.com/content.asp?CID
=1247470 [https://perma.cc/C5YJ-M78M] (discussing University of South Carolina head football coach Steve Spurrier’s team wide ban of social media).
150. Id. (quoting Coach Spurrier on his Twitter policy).
151. See Kristian Dyer, Florida State Bans Its Players from Twitter, YAHOO!
SPORTS (July 20, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/ncaaf-dr-saturday
/florida-state-bans-players-twitter-222622167—ncaaf.html [https://perma.cc/
442F-MZEH] (discussing FSU Twitter ban).
152. See id. (discussing FSU player tweeting rap lyrics containing phrase “kill
the cops”). See also, Erin Sorensen, College Football 2012: Florida State Players Show
Why Twitter Should Be Banned, BLEACHERREPORT (July 9, 2012), http://bleacherre
port.com/articles/1252534-college-football-2012-florida-state-players-show-why-twit
ter-should-be-banned (“Florida State head coach Jimbo Fisher has found his players tweeting things such as, ‘[c]hild support is worse than aids.’”).
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Student-athlete activity on social media platforms present a
unique dilemma for colleges and universities.153 Student-athletes’
social media posts are closely monitored by hundreds of thousands
of followers and the posts can reveal potential school, conference,
and NCAA violations.154 Examples such as Ohio State quarterback,
Cardale Jones’ infamous tweet make the attractiveness of social media policies readily apparent.155 The motivations for restricting student-athletes’ social media use are obvious: “[s]chools and coaches
wish to avoid negative attention and embarrassment. They want
student-athletes to create a positive image of the school and the
team and are willing to censor student-athletes to achieve this end
even if it may be unconstitutional.”156
If the individuals subject to these speech restrictions were
merely students at their respective universities, these bans or restrictions would be open-and-shut cases of government censorship.157
However, because these individuals are student-athletes, the situation is more complex: “[t]here is no question that student-athletes
agree to increased regulation of their lives in exchange for the ability to represent their university on an athletic team. And yet there
must be some limits on the university’s ability to intrude upon its
athletes’ rights.”158 As educational institutions attempt to toe the
line between freedom and control, it is time to think about just how
far institutions may go in the name of protecting the reputation of
their athletic programs.159
153. See, e.g., Kayleigh R. Mayer, Colleges and Universities All Atwitter: Constitutional Implications of Regulating and Monitoring Student-Athletes’ Twitter Usage, 23
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 455, 456 (2013) (“[T]witter becomes a problem when student-athletes tweet about other players, dissatisfaction with their coaches, playing
time frustrations, or intimate details about their personal lives.”).
154. See generally Jon Solomon, What to Do About Social Media? Colleges Tackle
How to Monitor What Athletes Are Saying, AL.COM (July 24, 2011, 8:00 AM), http://
www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2011/07/what_to_do_about_social_media.html
[https://perma.cc/55C9-MBPA] (discussing UNC football player Marvin Austin
whose tweets of watch he bought, designer purse, and bill for over one hundred
dollars at Cheesecake Factory brought NCAA investigations on UNC).
155. See Cardale Jones (@Cordale10), TWITTER (Oct. 5, 2012, 8:43 AM) (“Why
should we have to go to class if we came here to play FOOTBALL, we ain’t come to
play SCHOOL classes are POINTLESS.”).
156. Gay, supra note 6, at 797.
157. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”).
158. Harris, supra note 1.
159. See, e.g., Mina Kimes, Social Media Bans May Violate College Athletes’ First
Amendment Rights, ABCNEWS (Sept. 2, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/social
-media-bans-violate-college-athletes-amendment-rights/story?id=33482714 [https:/
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III. DISCUSSION
The Discussion section frames the debate regarding speech
rights as applied to student-athletes.160 Section A will discuss arguments against the constitutionality of social media bans as applied
to student-athletes.161 Section B will detail arguments supporting
the constitutionality of student-athlete social media bans.162 Finally, section IV of this article will recommend that universities implement narrowly-tailored social media bans that respect the rights
of student-athletes while protecting university interests.
A. Argument Against Constitutionality of Social Media Bans
The first step in analyzing a potential First Amendment claim is
to determine what type of government regulation occurred.163 The
forum analysis is inapplicable to internet speech as courts have refused to treat the internet as a public forum, with the exception of
government operated websites.164 Therefore, the regulation of student-athletes’ social media use does not fit neatly into this particular traditional analysis:
[I]nstead of applying a forum analysis for social media
postings by college and university students, courts typically
treat social media postings as “off-campus speech” and will
only uphold a college or university’s regulation of a student’s social media activity if the college or university can
prove the speech was (1) a material disruption to the
school, and/or (2) falls under another category of unprotected speech.165
/perma.cc/6R3M-ARSU] (discussing constitutionality of social media bans for collegiate athletes).
160. See infra notes 163–201 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 163–180 and accompanying text.
162. See infra notes 181–201 and accompanying text.
163. For further discussion of forum analysis see supra notes 40–59.
164. See Elizabeth Henslee, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Public
Forum: Why a Public Forum Analysis Applied to the Library Should Protect Internet Services
and Delivery Systems, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 777, 821 (2015).
Despite this argument, the Court has failed to treat the internet as a public forum taking a strict construction of the public forum doctrine and
placing an emphasis on the ‘tradition’ and ‘history’ of the traditional
public forum thereby making the internet ineligible for consideration
due to its recent appearance in American culture and communication.
Id.
165. See Eric D. Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of the Use
of Social Media by College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices for Athletic Departments,
38 J.C. & U.L. 451, 457 (2012) (discussing application of traditional public forum
analysis to student-athlete social media use).
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For a social media regulation to be valid under the disruption
test, outlined in Tinker, university athletic departments must prove
that the prohibited speech would materially disrupt the institution’s
educational operations.166 However, federal district courts nationwide have found the Tinker test difficult to apply; “[i]t is not entirely
clear whether Tinker’s rule applies to all student speech that is not
sponsored by schools . . . or whether it applies only to political
speech or to political viewpoint-based discrimination.”167
An important clue to understanding Tinker’s application to
post-secondary institutions can be found in the fourth footnote of
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth,
which indicates that college students are granted greater speech
protection than high school students.168 The protection gap between college and high school is best evidenced by Papish v. Board of
Curators of the University of Missouri, where the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court’s ruling that no disruption of a university’s
functions occurred due to a student distributing newspapers containing vulgar language and cartoons.169 Papish stands in stark contrast with Poling, where the Supreme Court upheld a high school’s
decision to disqualify a student from running for Student Council
President because the student’s candidacy speech contained expletives.170 Following the trend of granting college students greater
speech protection than high school students, the Court in Healy v.
James stated that on-campus college speech deserved protection
equaling that of off-campus speech.171
Southworth, Papish, and Healy indicate that ordinary college students may engage in on- or off- campus speech that does not substantially disrupt the operation of the school.172 Unfortunately, this
reasoning does not align perfectly with the reality of the college
athlete as the Supreme Court has stated that by voluntarily agreeing
to participate in athletics, student-athletes forgo some of the rights
166. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969). For further discussion about Tinker’s substantial disruption test, see supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
167. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 2006).
168. For further discussion about Southworth, see supra notes 118–159 and accompanying text.
169. For further discussion about Papish, see supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
170. For further discussion about Poling, see supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
171. For further discussions about Southworth, Papish, and Healy, see supra
notes 168–171 and accompanying text.
172. For further discussion about Healy, see supra notes 107–112 and accompanying text.
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afforded to ordinary students.173 Nonetheless, even accepting the
Court’s assertion, it stands to reason that a college athlete’s speech
should receive protection somewhere between the speech of an ordinary college student and that of a high school student.174
If student-athlete speech rights exist somewhere in the grey
area between high school and college, it is logical to use Tinker’s
application to high school to form the floor of athlete speech protections.175 To uphold a speech restriction under Tinker, student
speech must substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.176 Courts have narrowed Tinker at the high school level to allow administrators to prevent speech that would prohibit discourteous or profane student
language, censor school-sponsored speech due to genuine educational concern, and restrict speech impacting student safety.177 It is
hard to argue that even the most profane tweet authored by even
the most popular student-athlete would cause the substantial disruption of a college campus as required under a more relaxed version of the Tinker test.178 Further, a university’s main reason for
implementing a ban on social media is to protect the reputation of
the student-athlete’s team, the athletic department, and the university at large.179 It appears that such a purpose fails to meet the “substantial disruption” requirement of the Tinker test, even when
compared to its application at the high school level; however,
courts have looked to other precedent to support bans on studentathlete online speech.180
173. For further discussion about Vernonia, see supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
174. For further discussion about collegiate athletes receiving speech protection between the rights of a college student and a high school student, see infra
notes 175–180 and accompanying text.
175. For further discussion about using high school student speech protections as a floor for college athletes, see infra notes 176–180 and accompanying
text.
176. For further discussion about Tinker, see supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text.
177. For further discussion about case narrowing Tinker, see supra notes
77–100 and accompanying text.
178. For a further examples of student-athlete social media posts, see supra
148–156. For a further discussion of the Tinker test as applied to college athletes,
see supra notes 175–177.
179. For further discussion about why schools implement social media bans
for student-athletes, see supra notes 148–159 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty.,
Illinois, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). For further discussion about the Pickering decision,
see infra notes 191–198 and accompanying text.
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B. Argument for the Constitutionality of Social Media Bans
Various court decisions suggest that coaches and state-sponsored institutions can set constraints on their athletes’ speech, including their use of social media.181 Even the Supreme Court has
recognized that student-athletes participating in extracurricular
sports “voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even
higher than that imposed on students generally.”182 The Court
noted that due to all the restrictions placed upon them, athletes are
constitutionally different and that “[s]omewhat like adults who
choose to participate in a ‘closely regulated industry,’ students who
voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”183
In the realm of collegiate athletics, coaches have extraordinary
authority over their athletes; as evidenced by its holding in Vernonia,
the Supreme Court silently approves this structure and the decision’s consequential division between student-athletes and their
peers.184 However, this distinction is by no means a legal fiction as
intercollegiate student-athletes are in fact unique from ordinary
college students and are subjected to different regulations than the
student body at large.185 The distinction between the student-athlete and their peers exists for two main reasons: “(1) student athletes are highly regulated both on and off the field or court, and
(2) team unity outweighs any unfettered right to free expression.”186 Some states, such as California, have held that even the
bodily conditions of students may be strictly regulated:
181. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588, 591 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting
“top-down” nature of school authority, particularly in relation to athletics);
Wildman ex rel. Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir.
2001) (holding that requiring player to apologize to team by letter prior to rejoining team after criticizing her coach did not violate First Amendment rights of
student-athlete); Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 1972) (noting
that University of Wyoming was well within its rights to protect invasion of rights
of other teammates as basis for prohibiting wearing of armbands as form of hostile
speech toward Mormon religion).
182. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (explaining that students who participate in school-sponsored athletics have lower expectation of privacy than general students).
183. Id. at 657.
184. See supra note 173.
185. See Meg Penrose, Outspoken: Social Media and the Modern College Athlete, 12
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509, 512 (2013) (“State colleges and universities
have enormous control and influence over their athletes, and the First Amendment imposes no impediment to protecting both the athletes and the universities
they represent.”).
186. Id. at 546.
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[P]articipation in intercollegiate athletics, particularly in
highly competitive postseason championship events, involves close regulation and scrutiny of the physical condition and bodily condition of student athletes. Required
physical examinations (including urinalysis), and special
regulation of sleep habits, diet, fitness, and other activities
that intrude significantly on privacy interests are routine
aspects of a college athlete’s life not shared by other students or the population at large.187
Athletes are held to different academic standards, class attendance standards, and character standards than non-athlete students.188 On top of all these guidelines and regulations, athletes
are also subject to obligatory athletic codes of conduct and coachimposed “team rules” that control conduct both on and off campus.189 By voluntarily participating in meticulously-organized and
intensely-controlled athletic programs, college athletes subject
themselves to greater restrictions on their conduct and speech than
athletes at lower levels of sports.190
For this school of thought, the approach from Pickering v. Board
of Education could be the applicable standard.191 In Pickering, the
Supreme Court held that public employees had the right to speak
on issues of public importance without being disciplined for their
viewpoint.192 Pickering is not a perfect fit, as applying the “public
employee” label to student-athletes is theoretical and highly contro-

187. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal. 1994).
188. See, e.g., Meg Penrose, Tinkering with Success: College Athletes, Social Media
and the First Amendment, 35 PACE L. REV. 30, 43 (2014) (Student-athletes “often
must maintain a particular grade point average to remain on the team. They must
attend study hall, have unique access to tutors and tutoring, and find themselves
traveling the country, if not the world, in pursuit of athletic competition”).
189. See, e.g., Penrose, supra note 185, at 513 (“Athletes have always been subjected to greater scrutiny and regulation by the State, via their coaches and state
university athletic departments.”).
190. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (“By
choosing to ‘go out for the team,’ they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree
of regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally.”); see also
Hauer, supra note 126, at 427 (“Thus the burden on college student-athletes is
greater than that on high school athletes, all while protecting a lesser state
interest.”).
191. 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding public high school teacher had right to
speak on issues of public importance without being fired).
192. See, e.g., id. at 574 (“Absent proof of false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”).
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versial.193 However, courts have applied the Pickering ruling to student-athlete speech.194 For example, in 1981, University of
Oklahoma student-athletes filed suit against the university when the
student-athletes’ attempts to have their head coach removed resulted in losing their athletic scholarships.195 The Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit upheld the university’s decision not to renew
the athletes’ scholarships by analyzing the case under the public
employment line of cases established by Pickering.196 The court reasoned that the athletes’ critical speech did not rise to the Pickering
level of matters of public concern and was hesitant to declare that
locker room speech rises to the level of speech that Pickering protects.197 Because case law is mixed regarding whether a college athlete equates to a university employee, there are some questions
about applying a pure Pickering standard to the unique situation of
a college athlete.198
Alternatively, a state university could implement a policy that
prevented student-athletes from posting content that would fall
under a category of low value or unprotected speech.199 This type
of policy would likely be valid because low-value speech receives the
least amount of First Amendment protection; however, the policy
would have a limited application because these classes of speech are
narrowly defined and the Supreme Court has refused to create new
categories of low-value speech.200 Further, the effectiveness of this
193. See Sean Alan Roberts, College Athletes, Universities, and Workers’ Compensation: Placing the Relationship in the Proper Context by Recognizing Scholarship Athletes as
Employees, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 1315 (1996) (defining student-athletes as employees
for purposes of workers’ compensation.). See also Lori K. Mans & J. Evan Gibbs,
Student Athletes as Employees?, FLA. B.J. (Apr. 2015) (discussing Northwestern University Football team’s representation petition).
194. See Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734–35 (10th Cir. 1981) (affirming
dismissal of action).
195. See, e.g., id. at 733 (discussing athletes’ comments to press that, if head
coach remained in position, they would quit the team).
196. See, id. at 734 (citing Pickering and affirming trial court’s finding that
Plaintiffs’ comments were not regarding matters of public concern and were not
protected by First Amendment).
197. See id. (“[P]roblems created by the controversy between the scholarship
and non-scholarship players were internal problems [on the team] with which the
defendants were required to deal in their official capacities” and were not matters
of “general public concern and the plaintiffs’ comments to the press did not invoke First Amendment protection.”).
198. Compare Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457,
466 (1963) (finding that football player who died on school-sponsored airplane
trip was employee for Worker’s Compensation purposes) with Coleman v. W. Mich.
Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that football player on
scholarship was not employee for Worker’s Compensation purposes).
199. For a discussion of low value speech see supra notes 33–39.
200. For a discussion of low value speech see supra notes 33–39.
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type of policy would likely be moot as the government is already
given wide discretion to regulate speech that would fall under one
of the defined categories.201
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, an outright ban on student-athlete use of social
media would seem to be unconstitutional under the substantial disruption test outlined in Tinker.202 Restrictions on social media
posts’ content are a more complicated question because, while applying the Pickering standard to college athletes may not be ideal,
fcis]Pickering offers a more realistic approach than Tinker.203
Moreover, there are less invasive methods to control a student-athlete’s possibly offensive or repugnant social media activity.204 Universities could require student-athletes to participate in classes that
instruct how to use social media as a positive tool or schools could
require student-athletes to include a disclaimer on their public
profiles that the views of the profile reflect those of the athlete and
not of the institution itself.205 Both of these proactive steps would
protect a school’s reputation and distance the institution from the
possibly distasteful viewpoints of a player.206 To date, no studentathlete has challenged one of these social media bans (and it is
unlikely one will), but, by implementing narrowly-tailored social
media bans, universities can protect their own reputations and in-

201. For a discussion of low value speech see supra notes 33–39.
202. For further discussion about the constitutionality of bans on social media, see supra notes 163–201 and accompanying text.
203. See Gay, supra note 6, at 803 (2012) (“[I]t is also possible that the Tinker
test is an insufficient standard for this uniquely twenty-first century speech . . .
courts should decide whether those restrictions are significantly and narrowly tailored to not constitute an undue restriction on student-athletes’ rights of free
speech.”).
204. For further discussion about non-intrusive methods universities have
used to curb social media use of student-athletes, see infra notes 205–206 and accompanying text.
205. See Jaia A. Thomas, My Coach Won’t Let Me Twitter? Understanding the Legal
Implications of Social Media on and off the Field, 28 ENT. & SPORTS L. 18, 19 (2010)
(arguing for use of disclaimer on social media accounts).
206. See id. (positing that disclaimer could provide “extra coating” from liability between leagues and views of individual athletes).
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terests while also respecting the speech rights of their studentathletes.207
John Ryan Behrmann*
207. See Bentley, supra note 165, at 458–64 (providing list of tips universities
could follow to permissibly monitor student athlete online activity).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; Wilkes University 2015. I dedicate this article to my family for their encouragement and support throughout my academic career.
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